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Introduction 
“The basic paradox is that secrets fit awkwardly into a democracy, but secrets are sometimes 
necessary to protect.. .democracy.”  
Lee H. Hamilton[1]  
   
One of the most difficult challenges of operating an intelligence system in a democracy is finding 
a balance between the effectiveness (ability of the intelligence system to successfully carry out 
the assigned roles and missions) and transparency (access to intelligence information). In 
general, intelligence involves secrecy, which is vital for its effectiveness, while democracy calls 
for openness and accountability of the intelligence system, namely working in the context of the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, checks and balances, and defined mandates.  
Yet, too much secrecy has proven to affect intelligence’s effectiveness: assessments of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks in the United States concluded the attacks were a failure of intelligence due to the 
inability of the American intelligence agencies to share information with each other and with 
intelligence consumers.[2] Monitoring the current security landscape requires increased 
information sharing and expertise: the intelligence organizations need to get “information in front 
of as many people as possible so as to improve the odds that someone will see a telltale pattern.” 
On the other hand, too much transparency may affect the intelligence system’s effectiveness, in 
that it could be prohibitively expensive and endanger social values, such as protection of 
individual privacy, national security, and law enforcement.[3]  
With too much transparency, there would be no difference between an intelligence agency and a 
media organization or an NGO. Scrutinizing the activity of the intelligence organizations, as well 
as information sharing, is crucial to guarantee their transparency, but without affecting their 
capabilities to fulfill their mission: to inform the decision makers on the upcoming security threats 
and challenges.  
Achieving a proper effectiveness-transparency balance has been difficult for countries like 
Romania, which underwent a regime change; Romania had to “revolutionize” an intelligence 
apparatus that used to be the “force” of the totalitarian regime (relying heavily on secrecy and 
operating by the divide et impera principle) to one that actually respects and works for the new, 
democratic system.  
Romania did not let go of the past easily and, therefore, changing the intelligence system from a 
highly effective state security apparatus into a democratic community—equally effective and 
transparent—has been a Sisyphian effort, yet ultimately rewarding. Almost two decades after the 
regime change, Romania succeeded in accommodating the two competing interests of 
intelligence and democracy: effectiveness and transparency. Today, general awareness of the 
current security menaces (ergo recognition of the need of an increased intelligence effectiveness) 
exists among the new intelligence community, government, civil society, and citizens as well as 
acknowledgment of the need for accountability (ergo recognition of the need of strengthened 
control and improved information sharing). Romania’s struggle to achieve this tradeoff has 
resulted in a professional intelligence system, and a robust set of control mechanisms that 
includes direction and review/oversight, public access to documents, and deliberative meetings in 
which security issues are debated.  
This article examines how Romania managed to reconcile and achieve a tradeoff between the 
two competing imperatives of operating intelligence in a democracy—effectiveness and 
transparency. It analyzes what obstacles Romania overcame to accommodate the effectiveness 
of its post-communist intelligence system with the public need for information. 
The Communist Period: Effectiveness and Secrecy 
In 1947 the communists took power in Romania; and an intelligence agency was created in 
1951—the General Directorate of State Security (DGSS), including a Directorate for External 
Information (DIE) to support the regime. Under the Ceausescu administration (1965-1989), the 
DGSS underwent a few reforms and became the Department of State Security (DSS), dubbed 
the “Securitate.” Besides ensuring the protection and security of the country, the Securitate was 
used by Ceausescu to spy on the populace, with the help of a huge network of informants or 
collaborators of all ages and social backgrounds. At that time Romania was a “paranoid state that 
forced friend to spy on friend, lovers to betray each other to police, and informants to scour 
poems for signs of subversion.”[4]  
Securitate had special departments monitoring Romanians, dissidents living abroad, and political 
prisoners. It was a “malignantly” effective political police whose ubiquitous presence, fueled by a 
ceaseless campaign of repression and fear, seeded mistrust, suspicion, and corruption among 
the Romanians.  
Securitate was subjected to Ceausescu’s control and surveillance; at the minimum, officers within 
the DSS were under scrutiny by their superiors and vice versa; at the maximum, Ceausescu 
directly supervised Securitate units (i.e. the secret anti-KGB unit, which spied on those suspected 
to plot with the Russians), tasked their heads and had them report before him, and personally 
monitored/handled Securitate funds.[5] By the late 1980s, however, Securitate slowly evolved 
from a political police to an independent security state, due to a strong anti-Ceausescu faction 
within the institution, leaving Ceausescu alone in the rise of the 1989 events.[6]  
After the bloody revolt in 1989 and the fall of Ceausescu’s autocratic rule, Romania has 
sluggishly yet effectively wiped out the Securitate stain on the new intelligence system, which 
repeatedly faced allegations of being the Securitate heir; the new intelligence organizations are 
now transparent, under democratic control, and fulfill their mandates effectively and within the 
framework of sound domestic and international partnerships. In this context, clearing up the past 
has been very important; enabling citizens’ access to Securitate files (knowing what Securitate 
did and how it operated in the past) has been essential for acquiring populace’s understanding 
and trust, as well as increasing IC’s transparency at present.  
The Post-Communist Period: Effectiveness and Transparency 
After the end of the cold war, Romania established a new intelligence structure (composed of at 
least nine agencies) on the ruins of the former Securitate, retaining the infrastructure, logistics, 
personnel, and files of the former communist institution. Currently six intelligence agencies 
operate in Romania[7]: independent agencies include the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI); 
the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE); the Guard and Protection Service (SPP) and the Special 
Telecommunication Service (STS); and ministerial agencies include the General Directorate for 
Intelligence and Internal Protection (DGIPI) and the Directorate for General Information of the 
Army (DGIA). 
Their legal framework is based in the Law number 51/1991 on National Security and the 
Constitution of Romania of 1991 (amended in 2003), as well as legislation on the organization 
and functioning of each intelligence agency.  
The agencies conduct domestic and foreign intelligence and counter (or security) intelligence 
activities, as well as military/police intelligence. They have HUMINT, SIGINT and IMINT 
capabilities, do collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence and operate undercover. 
Romanian intelligence agencies have Rapid Intervention and Anti-Terrorism Brigades/Units 
including a Special Operations Force, capable to deploy within 72 hours anywhere for any type of 
mission.[8] 
Challenges and Solutions to Achieving a Tradeoff between Democratic 
Effectiveness and Transparency  
Democratizing the intelligence community in post-communist Romania has been a complex, 
challenging, and protracted journey to alienate a haunting past of secrecy and moral torture. 
Reforming intelligence was a joint venture of Romania’s elected authorities, the intelligence 
organizations, civil society, media, and the international community. The outcomes are rather 
impressive: the current Romanian IC has distinguished itself by democratic effectiveness, 
transparency and accountability, information sharing and partnerships. Romanian IC officers are 
currently deployed in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania, and Iraq. 
Effectiveness 
The breaking up of the Securitate in the early 1990s into many agencies (at least nine), 
functioning upon a faulty legal framework, and preserving a great percentage of former political 
police personnel, generated challenges to the democratization and effectiveness of the 
intelligence community in Romania. The problems included the following: overlapping of 
responsibilities (thus rivalries among the IC components), too much secrecy, and inadequate 
democratic work ethics (thus, lack of transparency, difficult democratic control, and politicization 
of intelligence), and poor human resource management (thus staffing and education/training 
difficulties). This situation lasted for years, primarily due to president Ion Iliescu’s long 
administration (1990-1996 and 2000-2004), a former communist party member opposing 
Ceausescu during the cold war who did not give up his communist beliefs after 1989, and who did 
not eliminate corruption and wrongdoing within the government.[9] Suffice it to say here, Iliescu 
refused to consider the merging of agencies (invoking a concern of returning to the old time 
Securitate) and appointed two former Securitate officers as heads of the first post-communist 
intelligence agencies (SRI and SIE). SRI’s head, Virgil Magureanu, was a former DIE officer who 
harbored thousands of Securitate officers within the SRI during his seven-year mandate, while 
SIE’s head was the notorious Mihai Caraman, who penetrated and stole information from NATO 
premises during the iron curtain period.[10] The “Caraman Network” (recruited by the DIE, but 
coordinated by the KGB) highly prejudiced the Atlantic Alliance in that it stole top secret 
documents from the NATO headquarters on the development of defensive and offensive lines in 
Europe until 1975; the costs to rethink the strategies and move military bases as a result of the 
theft were very high.[11] In Mihai Pacepa’s view, (former deputy head of the DIE, who defected to 
the United States in the early 1970s) after 1989, Virgil Magureanu, contributed to the politicization 
of the SRI, while Mihai Caraman, perpetuated the communist era duplicity towards western 
countries.[12]  
Reiterated accusations by the civil society, media and international community resulted in the 
removal of both Caraman and Magureanu from the SRI and SIE leadership; Mihai Caraman was 
replaced in 1992 (quite soon after his appointment) upon special request by former NATO 
Secretary General Manfred Woerner, while Magureanu was replaced in 1997 after the publication 
of an article in “The Washington Times” by Michael Ledeen (former U.S. Presidential Advisor) 
and Mihai Pacepa, stressing that Romania would lose NATO membership due to the continuation 
of thousands of Securitate officers in current intelligence structures.[13] Oddly, during his second 
term, Iliescu rehired into government (both executive and parliament) former Securitate personnel 
that president Constantinescu had fired during his administration (1996-2000), including: Mihai 
Caraman as the prime minister’s personal advisor and Ristea Priboi (deputy head of the foreign 
intelligence section of the Securitate), as head of the SIE oversight committee within the 
parliament.[14] Due to media and foreign pressure, Priboi resigned.[15]  
Later efforts were directed towards the downsizing of the old-timers from the post - communist 
services, especially to ensure Romania would be considered in the next NATO enlargement; 
NATO and EU accession were top priorities for the Romanian governments after the end of 
Ceausescu’s reign: NATO/EU membership has been seen by Romania as a proof of its alienation 
from Russia and return to the Western values, which Romania shared before communism, mainly 
explained by Romania’s Latin legacy. Before communism for example, Romania had strong ties 
with France: many Romanians studied in France and Bucharest, the capital of Romania, was 
known as the “Little Paris.” In regards to NATO membership, in 2002 yet another scandal burst 
out, when the Romanian press translated an article by the Wall Street Journal on the same topic: 
NATO’s lack of trust in the Romanian intelligence.[16] The result was quick: a few weeks after the 
article, the government in Bucharest announced that all intelligence officers assigned to work with 
NATO would be screened; later in November, the government created the National Registry 
Office for Classified Information (ORNISS) by Emergency Ordinance Number 153 of 2002 to 
issue both national and NATO security clearances; and the Romanian government accelerated 
the downsizing of the former Securitate personnel to lower ratios (DGIA has no Securitate officers 
in its units, while the SRI had only 4.5 per cent in 2006).[17]  
To finish with the Securitate legacy, Romania has been undertaking major efforts to 
professionalize the IC (to foster expertise, corporateness, and responsibility), to replace, thus, the 
old generations of intelligence agents with young open-minded intelligence professionals, with a 
true sense of responsibility to democracy.[18] To do this, it has institutionalized a new personnel 
management system, with modern recruiting, promotion, education and training techniques. By 
2007, the average age in the intelligence agencies came down to 35. These personnel graduated 
after 1989 and have no relation with Romania’s past political police. As well, the personnel of the 
IC anti terrorist units is professional, selected from champions of various NATO/PfP special 
operations exercises.[19]  
It is also worth mentioning president Traian Basescu’s commitment to promote young personnel 
and most important to curb political appointments. President Basescu appointed George Cristian 
Maior, a member of one of the opposition party, as head of SRI, in October 2006; Maior is a law 
graduate from the University Babes-Bolyai, Cluj-Napoca (1991), and the College of International 
and Comparative Law of George Washington University, in Washington D.C. He was deputy 
defense minister (2000-2004) and president of one the Parliament intelligence oversight 
committees from 2004 to October 2006.[20]  
The post communist IC personnel have benefited from modern, democratic intelligence and 
security education and training, both in Romania and abroad, which contributed greatly at 
increasing the IC professionalism. At the national level, Romania has the National Intelligence 
Agency (ANI), the High National Security College (HNSC), as well as specialized training units 
within other intelligence agencies, whose programs rely heavily on NATO/Western curricula and 
teaching expertise, and reflect the new security features.[21] The HNSC was established 
following the Citizen’s Academy within the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), while the 
SPP agents train together with the U.S. Secret Service agents.[22]  
At the international level, governmental programs and prominent institutions from democratic 
countries have contributed tremendously to increasing Romanian IC professionalism and 
effectiveness. The U.S. Counter Terrorism Fellowship (CTFP) program, which has trained SRI 
officers and the Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs) within the 1st Romanian Special Forces 
Battalion, has been instrumental in increasing Romania’s Special Operations Battalion and THTs 
readiness for deployment, as well as for expanding inter-agency cooperation and intelligence 
sharing.[23] Likewise, U.S. Navy SEAL, Green Berets, Delta Force, Marine Force Recon and 
SAS education and training programs have trained a great number of agents within the Romanian 
Rapid Intervention Units.[24] The U.S. Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) has conducted 
annual programs in intelligence (including democratic control of the intelligence, intelligence and 
combating terrorism, ethics in intelligence, the intelligence and the media etc), which gather 
together both intelligence professionals and representatives of the parliament, government and 
civic groups. The trainers have had only positive things to say in regard to Romanian IC 
professionalism, effectiveness and transparency. Bilateral relations and partnerships with 
intelligence agencies of consolidated democracies (with tradition in balancing effectiveness and 
transparency) have as well played a great role in strengthening Romania’s intelligence 
professionalism and effectiveness; a few examples are SRI and SIE consolidated relationships 
and joint operations with FBI and CIA and MI6, and SPP’s partnerships with U.S. Secret Service 
and France’s guard and protection service, which consolidated Romania’s IC position as a 
reliable partner in the international efforts to combat the new security challenges.[25] In addition, 
SRI leadership has been increasingly considering hiring “part time” specialists (such as 
sociologists, historians, economists, information technology specialists from the academia and 
civil society) to better the professionalism and effectiveness of the IC, an idea borrowed from the 
British system.[26]  
Consolidating the legal framework has led to redefined roles and missions for the agencies, 
strengthened interagency cooperation and information sharing, in parallel with protection of 
classified information. These efforts were sped up by NATO/EU membership pressure as well as 
by the need to better cope with the current security threats and challenges. First, the Romanian 
government enacted the national security law of 1991 as well as the main legislation on the 
organizing and functioning of each intelligence agency, to define mandates and structures for the 
IC (with the main focus on political neutrality of the IC). During the following years, this legislation 
was amended on several occasions. In addition, soon after the revolution the authorities 
developed the first national security strategy, which has been revised since then on a regular 
basis, thus ensuring feedback among policymakers, IC, and other security organizations. For 
instance, in 2001, the government changed the national security strategy to fit it into the post 9/11 
security background; the last revision took place in the spring of 2006.[27] In the post-9/11 
context, the Romanian government has passed legislation on countering and combating terrorism 
and organized crime, and established internal tools to counter terrorism, including new roles and 
missions and the adoption of a “National Anti-Terrorism Strategy”. At the international level, 
Romania has ratified all twelve United Nations counter terrorism conventions, as well as all the 
relevant international conventions on issues related to organized crime.[28] In April 2002, due to 
NATO’s pressure, Romania enacted the Law on Protection of Classified Information, which 
stipulates that classified information is given only in the circumstances and the conditions 
provided by law.[29] A national system of protection of information was instituted, while two 
bodies were created to hold national secret information and NATO classified information 
respectively, the Office of the National Registry of State Secret Information and the National 
Authority for Security.[30] A package of laws on national security (providing for better defined 
roles and missions and improved human resources management) has been under debate since 
early 2006; when finally adopted, it will contribute highly to the democratic consolidation of the 
intelligence system in Romania.[31]  
Additional steps to increase effectiveness included the establishment in 2005 by Traian Basescu 
of a National Intelligence Community (CNI), functioning under the National Defense Supreme 
Council (CSAT); CNI is a lead agency created to balance and channel competition among 
branches of the Romanian IC, and, thus, enhance inter-agency cooperation and intelligence 
sharing.[32] On the other hand, due to media and international public opinion criticisms, the 
number of agencies was gradually reduced to six by 2006, with the MOD gathering its intelligence 
agencies under a single agency during the early 2000s and elimination in 2006 of the MOJ’s 
intelligence agency, under EU’s pressure.  
The afore-mentioned undertakings have resulted in an improvement of the overall intelligence 
system’s capabilities and performance, which has been reflected in both Romanian and foreign 
public opinion. In Romania, a 2002 poll revealed that sixty percent of the Romanian citizens 
considered the new IC a modern democratic system; on the other hand the intelligence agencies 
have been receiving a great number of job applications during the last years, as a proof of 
citizens’ trust.[33] President Traian Basescu personally acknowledged Romanian IC’s 
democratization and effectiveness after the fall of the communist regime; in his view, the IC 
became NATO-compatible “before the rest of Romania.”[34] Abroad, former CIA director George 
Tenet decorated both Radu Timofte (SRI director) and Ion Stefanut (head of Anti Terrorism 
Brigade) in 2003 for direct support to the United States fight against terrorism; U.N. Secretary 
General Kofi Annan decorated colonel Vlad Dumitru (head of the SPP unit deployed in Sudan 
between 2004-2005 to ensure the protection U.N. officials in combat/conflict zones) with the U.N. 
Medal for exceptional” performance.[35] To sum up, Romania's international cooperation to fight 
the new security challenges has been “exceptional” and the United States has had “no better 
partner than Romania. Romania has made commitments and kept them up.”[36] 
Transparency 
Increasing IC effectiveness has been followed by proceedings to establish and augment 
accountability and openness, in order for Romania’s intelligence system to remain within 
democratic boundaries. This has been especially demanding considering Romania had no 
tradition of accountability to the people (other than Ceausescu), let alone to the rule of law. It was 
a “culture of secrecy” that Romania inherited in 1989 and the “public's right to know” notion had 
no meaning for the Romanian intelligence agencies during the first years of transition. National 
security was motivated on numerous occasions by the IC in order to deny access to information, 
which led to public mistrust of IC openness: during the previously-mentioned poll, only twenty 
three percent of the population believed that the intelligence agencies offered sufficient 
information to the public.[37] Prolonged secrecy also favored corruption and abuse of office. The 
intelligence community therefore had to learn the “ABC of transparency.” Under these 
circumstances, ensuring openness took longer than achieving effectiveness, but it finally 
materialized: Romania developed and strengthened democratic control (executive, legislative, 
judicial, internal and external) and made possible public access to IC information (legal measures 
permitting citizens to obtain intelligence records of various types). Hence, making available 
information about intelligence has ultimately led to public understanding and less cynicism 
towards the IC in Romania. Additional work focused on promoting a political culture to raise 
confidence in intelligence both within and outside the IC, enhancing civilian awareness and 
competence and launching informed public debates. 
Control and Accountability 
Romania established democratic control (executive, legislative and judicial) of the intelligence 
agencies in the early 1990s. The executive control (tasking, prioritizing, and making resources 
available) is exercised by the National Defense Supreme Council (CSAT), composed of the 
president, prime minister, SRI and SIE heads and various ministers, which was established under 
Law Number 39 of 13 December 1990 to organize and coordinate the IC activity.[38] The 
legislative control and oversight, exercised by standing/permanent and select/special committees, 
include: setting the legal framework on the organization and mandates of intelligence; assessing 
the implementation of the legislation; providing IC funds and holding IC accountable for its 
expenditures; reviewing IC activity; and consuming intelligence.[39] Judicial control is stipulated in 
Law 51/1991 on National Security and consists in ensuring the legality of IC activities (for 
instance, obtaining a warrant from the public prosecutor in order to carry out acts that infringe 
upon the privacy of citizens).[40] While the executive and legislative control mechanisms have 
been strong (with the CSAT and legislative committees meeting frequently to direct, review, 
assess and make inquiries about IC and other national security components’ activity) judicial 
oversight has been the ‘weakest link” of the control/oversight chain in Romania due to faulty legal 
framework and corrupt magistrates.[41] Overall control has also been undermined by several 
issues, such as the existence of too many intelligence agencies, the state’s initial focus on other 
issues (elections, institutional engineering, economic reforms)[42], political infighting between the 
president and the prime minister with regard to control of intelligence (a consequence of the semi 
presidential system), insufficient parliamentary expertise in the intelligence field (they change with 
every legislature), lack of teamwork within parliamentary committees as well as between former 
and current members of the oversight committees, and uncooperative and unsupportive attitudes 
of the IC when asked to make information available to the legislators (despite the fact that they 
have appropriate clearances).[43] Nevertheless, when formal mechanisms failed to exercise their 
power, the Romanian press has stepped in, informed the Romanian citizens and the international 
community of the IC wrongdoing, and thus encouraged the government to make reforms.[44] The 
press warned on cases when the new IC became politicized and covered cases of corruption and 
undermining of the economy by the intelligence officers after 1989; during Romania’s race for 
NATO membership, Romanian newspapers published lists of former Securitate officers in key 
governmental positions, which alerted public opinion both at home and abroad; and, as previously 
mentioned, the Romanian press translated a series of foreign press articles warning that NATO 
would not consider Romania for membership if former political police officers continued to work 
for the IC. All these led to personnel reduction, improved legislation (i.e., the law on protection of 
classified information or leak prevention programs), and more transparency.  
Furthermore, from the need to overcome the public apathy toward intelligence and wipe away the 
Securitate stigma, the Romanian IC has initiated a campaign to cultivate a political culture that 
supports and trusts intelligence both within and outside the IC.[45] Earliest contributions to 
developing an intelligence awareness among IC outsiders in general and those who oversee its 
activity in particular, included the creation of the previously-mentioned HNSC, which educates 
parliamentarians, government representatives, civil society members, academia and journalist in 
the security and intelligence field, as well as common education and training arrangements with 
other nations on the same topics. In addition, Romanian IC has launched pubic debates (from 
joint education and training programs to talk shows, NGOs-Government-international community 
initiatives, round tables, debates on the laws etc) with government officials, NGOs and the media 
representatives, on specific topics (i.e. oversight, the adequacy of the IC roles and missions in the 
21st century, transparency, etc.) Occasionally, the agencies have requested ad hoc meetings 
with their oversight committees in the parliament to establish ways and means to strengthen 
cooperation, communication and mutual respect between both institutions.[46] Such joint training, 
meetings and debates enabled the IC outsiders in Romania to more realistically comprehend why 
intelligence is needed (awareness of the national security threats and challenges), what the IC 
values and limitations are (to include understanding the need for secrecy of the intelligence 
agencies in order to effectively carry out their missions) but also helped increase the IC expertise 
and transparency (understand the need to open more to the public). President Basescu 
acknowledged the need for secrecy in the effectiveness of the IC work, within a democratic 
system, arguing that there is no such thing as an entirely transparent IC worldwide, on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, that too much transparency would make no difference between an 
IC and an NGO.[47] Moreover, numerous journalists have emphasized in their coverage the IC 
reform accomplishments and informed the Romanian public opinion on international recognition 
of the IC professionalism; embedded media, which has had the possibility to write and interview 
Romanian IC troops in the theater operations, has praised the IC effectiveness and 
professionalism, as well.  
On the other hand, a Law was enacted in December 2002 on Decisional Transparency in Public 
Administration, which guarantees public access to meetings conducted by public agencies.[48] 
The law requires the meetings of government bodies to be open to the public, demands the public 
authorities to invite citizens to participate in decision-making process and to disclosure 
information about pending activities. In 2005 there were 8769 requests for information on draft 
laws and 7140 recommendations received, of which sixty four percent were included in the draft 
acts.[49] There are no available statistics for 2006, but there were situations when 
representatives of the civil society participated in various Parliamentary debates on legislation 
pertaining to both national security and intelligence.  
It is also worth mentioning the decision adopted in the fall of 2006 that stipulates that the 
president, prime minister, all cabinet members, and all parliamentarians no longer need security 
clearances to be able to have access to classified information.[50] 
Free Access to Information 
Freedom of Information is granted by t he Constitution of Romania, which empowers the citizens’ 
free access to any information of a public interest, without prejudice; the public authorities are 
obliged to make available to citizens correct information on public affairs and issues of personal 
interest.[51] But freedom of information legislation was not adopted until early 2000s, when the 
Freedom of Information Access Law was enacted.[52] Law No. 544 of 12October 12, 2001 on 
Free Access to Public Information stipulates the following: the Romanian citizens have 
unconstraint access to government records and documents; the public authorities are obliged to 
respond within ten or thirty days, depending on the scope of the requested information; the public 
authorities are obliged to publish basic information about their structures and activities, as well as 
to create public relations departments and designate spokespersons; and, a specific section 
concerning mass media obliges the public authorities to hold news briefings on a regular basis, 
whereby the spokespersons are obliged to respond to all media inquiries.[53] The adoption of the 
law on FOIA was a success of transparency in Romania in two ways: first, it granted Romanians 
access to government records; second it was a fruitful cooperation between government, political 
parties and civil society. It was the first time when civil society representatives participated in the 
law making process, from the beginning to the end, which allowed them to provide valuable 
insight to the drafters, (including international critique on the drafts) and made the media more 
familiar with specific issues pertaining to freedom of information.[54]  
Additional freedom of information legislation efforts include the Law No. 16/1996 of April 1996 
Version (updated in July 2002) on the National Archive, stipulating the regulations on access to 
archived information, the Law No. 677/2001 for the Protection of Persons concerning the 
Processing of Personal Data and Free Circulation of Such Data, which enable citizens to access 
and amend personal information held by public or private bodies and the 2003 Law on Certain 
Steps for Assuring Transparency in Performing High Official Positions, Public and Business 
Positions, for Prevention and Sanctioning the Corruption, which stipulates the creation of a 
National Computerized System to enable public access to electronic information and government 
data.[55]  
Notwithstanding the legislative efforts, sometimes access to intelligence information has been 
rather difficult, because the agencies would invoke national security for not disclosing information. 
In addition, there have been situations when NGOs won a case to access information (i.e. on the 
wiretaps authorized by the general prosecutor for a ten year period) but could not obtain it due to 
the prosecutor’s ignorance of the court order; even though the NGOs filed a civil suit against the 
prosecutor and the institutions were penalized with a fine per each day for withholding of 
information, it was not until the media had stepped in (covering on the huge number of wiretaps 
authorized and the names of the persons under surveillance), when the information was finally 
released.[56] Nevertheless, in 2006, civil society appreciated as positive the responsiveness of 
the public authorities to information access requests yet acknowledging some problems in 
excessive costs and accommodating “delicate” requests.[57] In addition, Romania's progress 
towards transparency is acknowledged in a report called “Transparency and Silence” published at 
in 2006 by Open Society Justice Initiative, which concludes that public access to government 
information in Eastern Europe is comparable with that in established democracies, specifically 
mentioning Romanian government’s promptness to respond to public request for accessing 
information as compared to counterpart agencies in France and Spain; the report specifies that 
sixty percent of the requests filed in Romania were accommodated, by contrast with thirty one 
percent in France and twenty-four percent in Spain.[58]  
Yet the most important piece of legislation with regard to transparency of the intelligence 
community is the Law No. 187 of December 1999 on the Access to the Personal File and the 
Disclosure of the Securitate as a Political Police. The law stipulates the following: access to 
personal Securitate files; access to the files of the candidates for public office to establish their 
past involvement with the Securitate; and defend/prove the innocence of public office runners 
from false allegations of Securitate involvement.[59] The law, also known as the “lustration law” or 
“Ticu law” (because it was initiated by Ticu Dumitrescu, a former political prisoner and current 
head of the Association of Former Political Prisoners), represents a break-away from the 
communist past and a new chapter in the democratic control of the intelligence in Romania. It led 
to the creation of the National Council for the Study of Securitate Archives (CNSAS), which was 
tasked to apprehend the former Securitate archives from the intelligence agencies, except for 
those jeopardizing national security. In compliance with the law, the CNSAS has the following 
rights: to access the former repressive intelligence agency’s files and records even before the 
transfer of the archives to its headquarters; to publish the names of the former Securitate 
personnel or collaborators, especially if they are current political figures or are running for office; 
and to sue the intelligence agencies for lack of compliance with the law (citizens have the same 
right too).[60] But despite the power of the law, the activity of the CNSAS during the first years 
since its creation was modest, mainly facilitating access to personal files. This was due to the 
following: refusal of the intelligence agencies to hand over the archives, invoking CNSAS’ lack of 
adequate storage and national security; CNSAS management infighting; government opposition 
to what files to made public and what not (supporting a selective publication and/or using the 
archives them for political ends) without observing the law which stipulates that classification of 
the files should be decided by both the intelligence agency owning the files and the CNSAS.[61] 
According to researchers, refusal to publish communist era documents (other than those 
pertaining to specific technical or military information) on national security grounds is 
unjustified.[62] CNSAS’ activity has also been hampered by the Council’s denial of access to 
important files by the agencies, alteration of selected files by the agencies, destroying records or 
making them vanish, as well as misuse of files.[63] In this particular case, historian Marius Oprea, 
a former dissident and critic of the regime and Securitate and currently Romanian prime 
minister’s advisor, refuses to believe that, officially, there is no single file on Ceausescu, 
considering that all the intelligence organizations from other former communist countries had 
archives on their leaders; Oprea believes that Ceausescu’s archive would reveal that many 
current political figures were Securitate officers.[64] Even current president Traian Basescu 
acknowledges the possibility that the intelligence agencies made some files disappear and/or 
altered/fabricated other.[65] In short, the CNSAS’ activity between 2001 and February 2005 
consisted in apprehension of only 9,442 files (approximately 700 meters) and making public a list 
of 38 candidates to the 2000 elections, who were found to have collaborated with the Securitate; 
many of the 38 alleged suspects either resigned voluntarily or upon request by their political 
parties.[66]  
It was not until the CSAT adopted a Resolution in February 2005 urging the transfer of all files to 
CNSAS that the Council started to be more effective.[67] In 2005 for instance, the Council 
received 1,298,960 files (approximately 12.5 kilometers), finalized 2,048 requests for access to 
personal file (of which 1,568 were received in 2005 and the rest were unsolved requests from 
previous years), revealed to those who requested to see their files the names of 49 persons 
alleged to inform on them.[68] Thus, between 2001 and 2005, the Council took into custody 
1,306,875 records (1,564,340 volumes), of which 1,306,102 from SRI, 132 from SIE 341 from the 
Ministry of Justice’s former Intelligence Directorate (which was abolished in 2006), and no file 
from the MOD’s DGIA.[69] The transfer was completed in December 2006, when SRI, SIE and 
DGIA handed over two million files to CNSAS, under President Basescu’s direct supervision. SRI 
still keeps 75,000 secret files (counter espionage and terrorism related), whose declassification, 
according to the SRI, would endanger national security, but to which the CNSAS members will 
have full access.[70]  
Since 2006, when the Council received the majority of the records, the CNSAS has published a 
great number of files upon review, which exposed collaboration with the DSS of various 
politicians, academics, intellectuals, athletes, clergy members and journalists, some of whom 
have been strong supporters of democratic reforms and transparency after the fall of communism. 
But what really came as a big shock and caused public anger, was discovering that thousands of 
children as young as nine years old (recruited by the Securitate from high-quality learners and 
good athletes, yet of modest social background) spied on their families and colleagues.[71] The 
Council has revealed that the children informed when their classmates or families criticized the 
communist party or the regime, whether they were listening to foreign radio stations (such as 
Radio Free Europe or the Voice of America), or if they had contact with foreigners.[72] The 
Securitate recruiters were paid extra for engaging children in spying, commensurate with the 
number of children recruited.[73] This is especially intriguing as there was no law before 1989 to 
legitimate Securitate recruiting minors.[74] According to researchers, one could not exclude the 
possibility that some of the informants may still collaborate with the present intelligence agencies 
or work for them.[75] As stated by a member of the Institute for Studying Communism Crimes 
(IICCR), a governmental organization established by Decree No. 1724 of 2005 to uncover truth 
about the communist regime is preparing to bring to justice dozens of former Securitate officers 
who recruited children.[76]  
As CNSAS appeared to mostly disclose the collaborators (without differentiating between those 
who voluntarily became informants and those who were forced to) rather than the Securitate 
officers, CNSAS and civil society’s efforts to modify the Ticu Law have lead to adoption in 
October 2006 by the Parliament of a series of amendments to the law, including: elimination of 
the “political police” phrase from the body of law; reformulation of the definition of a “Securitate 
collaborator” as the person who “voluntarily informed or facilitated the transmission of information 
that denounced activities or attitudes against the communist regime, which would infringe upon 
fundamental human rights and liberties” to include the heads of the communist party of all 
echelons who commanded the Securitate and whose orders violated human rights; making the 
CNAS resolutions public after publishing them in the “Official Gazette”; and publishing lists with 
Securitate officers.[77] Accordingly, a single engagement or a few informative notes from a 
“fabricated” file would be enough to decide collaboration.[78] Since 2003, the CNSAS’ website 
has published lists with the officers who did political police work, the last list being posted on the 
November 13, 2006.[79] In addition, the researchers of the Securitate archives will notify the 
authorities on whether informants harmed the people they spied on, and although there is no 
punishment, a draft law was proposed stipulating the banning of former Securitate collaborators 
from public life.[80] Apart from these efforts, CNSAS also organizes exhibits of Securitate files 
and documents occasionally; during the 2003-2006 period, it had three exhibits, in Constanta, 
Timisoara and Arad.[81] 
The declassification of the archives of the former communist intelligence service has contributed 
to the efforts of the Presidential Commission for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in 
Romania, created in April 2006 to reexamine the history of communism and condemn the regime. 
The commission was set up following pressure by the European Union and civil society for the 
authorities in Bucharest to assess the transgressions of the former communist dictatorship and its 
supporters (be it organizations or physical persons).[82] The commission, also known as the 
“Tismaneanu Commission” (as it is headed by University of Maryland professor, Vladimir 
Tismaneanu) consists of academics, researchers, dissidents, historians, psychologists and 
anthropologists. After months of extensive work, hampered by numerous obstacles from several 
government institutions, the commission issued a report in December 2006, which indicted the 
Communist regime for crimes against humanity, of which the PCR and the Securitate were 
primary at fault; the 650 page report condemns many former apparatchiks, such as former 
president Ion Iliescu, Corneliu Vadim Tudor (current leader of the nationalist Romania Mare 
(Greater Romania) Party), without forgetting and forgiving Leon Tismaneanu who was deputy 
director of the government publishing house and published in support of the communist 
regime.[83] The commission concluded with a series of recommendations, including the 
establishment of a national day to commemorate the victims of the communism, creation of a 
dictatorship museum and study of the Communist dictatorship in high school.[84]  
The declassification of files has had painful consequences in that it has alienated families and 
shattered friendships. Despite all that, the majority of Romanians say opening of the files is chief 
for Romania’s move away from the dark past and its ghosts.[85]  
Overall, all the above-mentioned efforts have contributed tremendously to the increase of the 
level of transparency of the IC in Romania and inculcating a security and intelligence culture 
within both the IC and in outside society. 
Conclusion  
Romania has implemented dramatic changes in the intelligence system since the end of 
Communism and accession to NATO and the EU—a relentless effort which gradually unchained 
the current intelligence community from Ceausescu’s dreaded secret police organization.  
Bolstered by a vigilant international community (which promised Romania NATO and EU 
membership in return for democratic control and transparency of the IC) and by an alert media (a 
real “Cerberus” of democracy, which has repeatedly denounced IC’s transgressions), the effects 
of the reform have been impressive and beneficial to the image and credibility of the Romanian IC 
at home and abroad; not only is the new intelligence system clearly under democratic control and 
more open to the public, but also appears to be effective both domestically and internationally. 
During almost twenty years of democratic consolidation, Romania has shifted from a “culture of 
secrecy” to “culture of security and transparency” both within its intelligence system and among 
IC outsiders, where secrecy (effectiveness) and democracy (transparency) weigh equally when it 
comes to national, regional or international security. One could, therefore, argue that Romania 
successfully handled the intelligence and democracy basic paradox of maintaining a both 
effective and transparent intelligence system at the same time. 
About the Author 
Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei joined the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) in 2003. She earned a BS in Physics from the University of 
Bucharest in 1996 and an MA in International Security Affairs and Civil-Military Relations from the 
Naval Postgraduate School in 2001. Before coming to NPS she worked for the Romanian Ministry 
of Defense as a political-military analyst. 
The views expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views 
of NPS, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email ccc@nps.edu 
with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be used for no other 
purpose. 
References 
1. The Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, "Remarks on Classification: Information Security Oversight Office," 
October 18, 2005. 
2. Bruce Berkowitz, “National Security: Secrecy and National Security,” Hoover Digest, No. 3 
(2004).  
3. Rodney A. Smolla, “The People's Right to Know: Transparency in Government Institutions,” 
Democracy Papers, U.S. State Department International Information Programs.  
4. Associated Press, “Opening of Romanian Secret Police Files Becomes National Obsession,” 
FoxNews.com, August 23, 2006. 
5. Razvan Savaliuc, “Iliescu a creat o baie de sange pentru a-si legitima puterea” (“Iliescu 
Created a Blood-Bath to Legitimate his Power”), Ziua, December 22, 1999; Daniel Neamu and 
Andrei Badin, “Crescent era 100% firma Securitatii. Ministru al comerŃului exterior explică cum s-
au furat 'banii lui Ceauşescu' in 1989” (“Crescent was Securitate’s firm 100 percent. Foreign 
Trade Minister Explains how Ceausescu’s Money Was 'Stolen' in 1989”), Adevarul, January 16, 
2007. 
6. Nevertheless, during the events in Timisoara, Securitate was involved in gunning down people 
at Ceausescu’s command. On December 17, 1989, in Timisoara, the DSS began shooting 
citizens in the streets. See “Ceausescu in Tehran,” Half Way Down the Danube, December 18, 
2003; also see Thayer Watkins, “After a Delay the Securitate Began to Shoot the Demonstrators,” 
The Economic History and the Economy of Romania. 
7. In addition, there is a National Intelligence Community created by CSAT in November 2005, 
and a “Center for Situations,” in the Prime Minister’s office; see Andoru Dragomir, “Tariceanu si-a 
facut un mic serviciu de informatii” (“Tariceanu Got Himself a Small Intelligence Service”), Ziua, 
June 29, 2006. 
8. "Romania's Special Operations Forces," Geocities.com.  
9. Examples of substandard work ethics, politicization, and rivalries among the IC components 
during Iliescu’s tenure are as follows: DGIPI (keeping journalists who wrote against Ion Iliescu 
under surveillance ("Terasa Anda" and "Capitanul Soare" cases) which DGIPI tried to attribute to 
the SRI); SRI (University Square events of June 13, 1990); and DGIA (threatening a journalist 
that he was under surveillance by the intelligence directorate within the Ministry of Defense). For 
more information on these cases, see: Ovidiu Zara, "Reprimarea 'golanilor' din Piata Universitatii 
s-a facut 'conform precizarilor' lui Ion Iliescu" (“Suppression of 'Hooligans' in University Square 
Happened in Compliance with Iliescu’s 'Indications'"), Curentul, June 14, 2005; “Ioan Mircea 
Pascu, un nou atac la adresa presei” (“Ioan Mircea Pascu, a New Attack To Press”), Evenimentul 
Zilei, October 11, 2004; "Politia politica a lui Basescu” (“Basescu’s Political Police”), Tricolorul; 
Dan Culcer, “Veniturile secrete ale securistilor, de 10 ori mai mari decat ale victimelor” (“Secret 
Income of the Securisti, Ten Times as high as the Victims”), Romania Libera, September 15, 
2006; “Amnezia SRI” (“SRI’s Amnesia”), Ziua, November 18, 1995. 
10. “Politia dictatorului” (“Dictator’s Police”), Interview with Mihai Pacepa, Ziua, September 4, 
2006. 
11. Marius Oprea, “Armaghedonul spionilor Reteaua Caraman” (“The Armageddon of Spies 
Caraman Network,”) Ziua, February 7, 2005; “Romanian Daily Publishes List of Securitate Agents 
Working in Intelligence,” Ziua, March 28, 2002; Mihai Pacepa, “NAVROM heads collaborated for 
industrial intelligence,” Ziua, September 9, 2006; Pierre Accoce and Deniel Puget, “Cei 
treisprezece romani care au zguduit NATO (“The Thirteen Romanians who Shook Up NATO”), 
Iasi, Multiprint 1999, 108-224.  
12. “Politia dictatorului” (“Dictator’s Police”), Op. Cit. 
13. The SRI reacted by accusing the newspaper of espionage, which offended American public 
opinion, as it was the first time after the fall of the Berlin Wall when an American newspaper was 
accused of spying. In response, two U.S. congressmen, Jesse Helms and Ben Gilman, wrote in 
the same daily that Romania would not be considered for NATO membership as long as the 
intelligence agencies were run by ex-Securitate personnel. The first NATO enlargement took 
place in Madrid in 1997 and Romania was one of the rejected aspirants. For more information 
see “Romanian Daily Publishes List of Securitate Agents Working in Intelligence,” Op. Cit.; Andrei 
Badin, Interview with Mihai Pacepa, “Generalul Pacepa dezvaluie colaborarea lui Virgil 
Magureanu cu Securitatea," Adevarul, January 5, 2006; “Politia dictatorului” (“Dictator’s Police”), 
Op. Cit. 
14. See Daniela Manolache Luca, “Reflectarea serviciilor secrete în presa scrisă românească la 
un deceniu dupărăbuşirea comunismului” (“The Imagine of the Secret Services in the Romanian 
Written Press a Decade since the Fall of Communism”); Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - 
The Balkans, September 22, 2006; and “Romanian Daily Publishes List of Securitate Agents 
Working in Intelligence,” Op. Cit. 
15. Daniela Manolache Luca, Ibid. 
16. Reporters Without Borders, Romania - Annual Report 2003. 
17. See Eugen Tomiuc, “Romania: Authorities To Screen Officers Likely To Work With NATO 
Secrets,” (Also at: http://www.orniss.ro/en/index.html) and “4.5 Percent Old-Timers in Intelligence 
Services, Romanian President Says,” Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review, October 19, 2006. 
18. In Bruneau and Boraz’ view, intelligence as a profession includes expertise, corporateness, 
and responsibility. Steven C. Boraz and Thomas C. Bruneau, “Reforming Intelligence. Democracy 
and Effectiveness,” Journal of Democracy XVII, No. 3, July 2006. 
19. "Romania's Special Operations Forces," Op. Cit. 
20. See “PNL prepares retort to Maior’s nomination at SRI. PSD, PNL don’t see nomination of a 
PSD member as head of Romania’s main intelligence service with friendly eyes,” Nine o’Clock, 
September 27, 2006, and Radu Tudor, “Tinerete, haine grele” (“Too Much for the Young to Bear”), 
Saptamana Financiara, No. 81, October 9, 2006. 
21. See Cristiana Matei, “Intelligence Community in Romania. From an Instrument of Dictatorship 
to Serving Democracy: Per Aspera ad Astra,” paper under review by the International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence. 
22. See: Serviciul Roman de Informatii and "Formatiunea Interventie Anti-terorista a SPP" ("The 
Protection and Guard Service's Anti-Terrorism Intervention Formation"), in "Romania's Special 
Operations Forces," Op. Cit. 
23. SRI is the counterterrorism coordinating body in Romania. Ira C. Queen, “The Value of 
Security Cooperation,” The DISAM Journal 28, No. 3, 2006.  
24. See: "Romania's Special Operations Forces," Op. Cit. 
25. Radu Tudor, “Lista teroristilor expulzati din Romania Numarul acestora a atins 70 in ultimii doi 
ani * PKK si Lupii Cenusii sunt organizatiile cu cea mai numeroasa prezenta in randul 
indezirabililor,” Ziua, February 16, 2002; “Directorul FBI despre modernizarea SRI” (“FBI Director 
on Modernizing SRI”), Cronica Romana, November 15, 2006; Bogdan Chireac, "Interview with 
SRI Director George-Cristian Maior," Pro Vest, November 26, 2006. 
26. Bogdan Chireac, Ibid. 
27. See Capitolul II Probleme de aparare/militare and Presedintele Romaniei.  
28. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans, Op. Cit, and Ira C. Queen, Op. Cit. 
29. See Serviciului de Informatii Externe. 
30. A case of infringement of this law was encountered in 2006 when two journalists illegally 
received classified information; they were both charged in February 2006 but one was released 
after a few days as ordered by the Supreme Court. See Romania page at FreedomInfo.org. 
31. The adoption is held back by political infighting between president and prime minister, who 
often belong to different political parties, a consequence of Romania’s semi-presidential system in 
which there is unclear constitutional separation of responsibilities between the president and 
prime minister.  
32. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans, Op. Cit. 
33. See Serviciul Roman de Informatii, Op. Cit., and “Rolul Serviciilor de InformaŃii intr-o 
Societate Democratică si in Procesul de Aderare a Romaniei la NATO” (“Role of Intelligence 
Services in a Democratic Society and in the NATO Accession Process”), a special edition 
broadcast by Romanian Television, March 23 2002. 
34. “4.5 Percent Old-timers in Intelligence Services, Romanian President Says,” Op. Cit. 
35. Jacqueline Prager, “Romania, halta CIA” (“Romania, CIA’s Stop”), Evenimentul Zilei Online, 
November 19, 2005; Ion Alexandru, Eduard Pascu, Dan Badea, “Epopeea SPP: Medaliat de Kofi 
Annan, dat afara de Gabriel Naghi” (“The SPP Epopee: Decorated by Kofi Annan, Fired by 
Gabriel Naghi”), Gardianul, June 1, 2006. 
36. General William L. Nash, Director of the Center for Preventive Action within the Council on 
Foreign Relations, Washington D.C, in Victor Roncea, “Strategia Romaniei, deasupra intereselor 
clasei politice” (“Romania’s Strategy Prevailing Over the Political Class’s Interests”), Ziua, 
October 7, 2006; Carl Levin, “Romania, cel mai bun partener militar al SUA” (“Romania, US’s 
Best Partner”), Ziua, February 2, 2007. 
37. “Rolul Serviciilor de InformaŃii intr-o Societate Democratică si in Procesul de Aderare a 
Romaniei la NATO” (“Role of Intelligence Services in a Democratic Society and in the NATO 
Accession Process”), Op. Cit. 
38. Se LEGE nr.39 din 13 decembrie 1990, privind înfiinŃarea, organizarea şi funcŃionarea 
Consiliului Suprem de Apărare a łării. 
39. For more information see Larry Watts, "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in 
Romania,” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Working Papers, 
2003, 30; Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, Security Intelligence Services in New 
Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania (London: Palgrave, 2001), 245-246; 
and Constantin Monac, Parlamentul si Securitatea Nationala (Parliament and National Security), 
(Bucharest, Monitorul Oficial, 2006), 71; Razvan Ionescu and Liviu Muresan “The Monitoring 
Exercise of Instruments and Mechanisms for Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in 
Romania,” (Pilot Project) of the EURISC Foundation, the Commission for Defense, Public Order 
and National Security of the House of Deputies, Parliament of Romania, and with the support of 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (Bucharest, 2004). 
40. See Camera Deputatilor XXXXI of the Parlamentul Romaniei.  
41. For detailed information on the oversight, see Cristiana Matei, “Intelligence Community in 
Romania. From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy: Per Aspera ad Astra,” Op. 
Cit. 
42. Still, the SRI director reported before the Parliament, for the first time in November 1990, 
given the public concern with a potential comeback of the Securitate. See: Larry Watts, Op. Cit., 
10.  
43. For more information see Razvan Ionescu and Liviu Muresan, “The Monitoring Exercise of 
Instruments and Mechanisms for Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in Romania,” Op. 
Cit. 
44. The press alerted the public opinion on cases when the new IC became politicized and During 
Romania’s race for NATO, Romanian newspapers published lists of former Securitate officers in 
key governmental positions, which alerted public opinion both at home and abroad; and 
previously mentioned, the Romanian press translated a series of articles warning NATO would 
not consider Romania for membership if former political police officers continue to work in the IC.  
45. Despite visible democratization and reform of the IC, written press had occasionally 
discredited the IC see Daniela Manolache Luca, “Reflectarea serviciilor secrete în presa scrisă 
românească la un deceniu după prăbuşirea comunismului,” Op. Cit.  
46. See the website of the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service.  
47. “President Basescu: Secret Services aren't NGOs,” HotNews.ro, December 20, 2006. 
48. See Romania page at FreedomInfo.org, Op. Cit. 
49. Ibid. 
50. This decision has been contested however by representatives of the IC and government who 
consider that the parliamentarians have to hold security clearances as a measure of protection of 
information, and as a proof they were not involved with the Securitate before 1989. “Liber la 
secrete. Deputatii si senatorii nu vor mai avea nevoie de certificat ORNISS pentru accesul la 
informatii clasificate” (“Secrets for Free. Deputies and Senators Will no Longer Need ORNISS 
certificate to Access Classified Information”) Ziua, November 30, 2006. 
51. Constitution of Romania, Article 31. 
52. Dr. Kenneth K. Baar, “Public Services through 'Private' Contracts, Transparency Issues,” 
March 1999.  
53. See LAW 544/12 October 2001 on Free Access to Public Information as well as: 
http://www.accesolibre.org/descargas/pdf/1158341502.pdf  
54. See: http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2/fs/?file_id=14256 (link currently inactive.) 
55. See Romania page at FreedomInfo.org, Op. Cit. 
56. Monica Macovei, “The Secret Policeman's Fall: In Post-Communist Romania, the 
Government is Making Real Progress towards Transparency and Openness,” Guardian Unlimited, 
October 26, 2006. 
57. See Romania page at FreedomInfo.org, Op. Cit.  
58. Monica Macovei, Op. Cit. 
59. See the text of the law on the access to the personal file and the disclosure of the Securitate 
as a political police at http://www.cdep.ro/legislatie/eng/vol44eng.pdf; also see Suzanne Travers 
and Edward Kanterian, “Casting Light on the Long Shadow of Romania's Securitate,” on the 
website of the Universitatea"Babes-Bolyai" Facultatea de Litere. 
60. See the text of the law on the access to the personal file and the disclosure of the Securitate 
as a political police, Ibid.; also see Suzanne Travers and Edward Kanterian, Ibid, and Marian 
Chiriac, “Romania: Rattled Skeletons Close Securitate Cupboard” on the website of the Institute 
for War and Peace Reporting, and also the UNDP's Early Warning Report Romania. 
61. See Marian Chiriac, Ibid., and the UNDP's Early Warning Report Romania, Ibid. 
62. Mark Percival, “State of the Nation: Opening the archives,” Vivid, October 5, 2006. 
63. Suzanne Travers and Edward Kanterian, “Casting Light on the Long Shadow of Romania's 
Securitate,” Op. Cit.; Mark Percival, Ibid.; and the Romania page at FreedomInfo.org, Op. Cit. 
64. Mark Percival, Ibid. 
65. "Romania hands over secret files," AlJazeera.net, December 29, 2006.  
66. See the website of Consiliul National Pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securitatii and Suzanne 
Travers and Edward Kanterian, Op. Cit.  
67. “Comunismul trebuie declarat regim criminal” (“Communism Must Be Declared Criminal 
Regime”), Miercurea Ciuc Online, September 25, 2006,  
68. See the website of Consiliul National Pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securitatii, Op. Cit. 
69. See the website of Consiliul National Pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securitatii, Ibid. 
70. Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review, January 3, 2007; note that in compliance with the law, 
the SRI has a veto right in deciding which files, if declassified, would threaten national security. 
71. A daily Romanian newspaper even published the file of a child informant in the summer of 
2006. “Scoala calailor de suflete Securitatea racola informatori de pe bancile scolii. «F» din Sibiu 
are azi 35 de ani. Cati or mai fi ca ea?” (“The School of Soul Executioners. Securitate Recruited 
Informants from Schools. “F” from Sibiu is 35 Today. How Many Like Her?”), Gardianul, July 17, 
2006; “Romania's Communist-Era Secret Police Recruited Children as Informants,” Associated 
Press Worldstream, July 18, 2006; “Vampirii Inocentei. Ofiterii Securitatii care foloseau minori ca 
informatori au promovat bine dupa 1989” (“The Vampires of Innocence. Securitate Officers Who 
Used Minors as Informats Were Promoted after 1989”), Gardianul, July18, 2006; Cazimir Ionescu, 
“Securitatea recruta copii chiar de la 12 ani” (“Securitate Recruited Children as Young as 12”), 
HotNews.ro, July 18, 2006  
72. “Romania's Communist-Era Secret Police Recruited Children as Informants,” Ibid. 
73. “Vampirii Inocentei. Ofiterii Securitatii care foloseau minori ca informatori au promovat bine 
dupa 1989,” Op. Cit.  
74. “Scoala calailor de suflete Securitatea racola informatori de pe bancile scolii. «F» din Sibiu 
are azi 35 de ani. Cati or mai fi ca ea?” Op. Cit.; “Presa Despre Racolarile De Minori Facute De 
Securitate” (“Press on Minors’ Recruiting by the Securitate”), HotNews.ro, July19, 2006.  
75. “Romania's Communist-Era Secret Police Recruited Children as Informants," Op. Cit. 
76. IICCR was set up “to investigate and to identify the crimes, the abuses and human rights 
violations during the communist regime in Romania, as well as to notify the state’s criminal 
investigation departments when such cases are discovered,” The Institute for the Investigation of 
Communist Crimes in Romania, and “Romania's Communist-Era Secret Police Recruited 
Children as Informants,” Ibid. 
77. Lia Bejan, “Mai scapa Ion Iliescu? Senatorii tocmai schimba legea CNSAS” (“Is Ion Iliescu 
Still Get Away with It? The Senators are Just Changing the CNSAS Law”), Gardianul, October 
12,.2006, and Cristian Anghelache, “Fostii sefi ai PCR, asimilati colaboratorilor” (“Former PCR 
Heads Viewed as Collaborators”), Realitatea Romaneasca, October 11, 2006. 
78. Anca Simina, “Mircea Dinescu somat: ori la CNSAS, ori la Patriciu-Vintu” (“Mircea Dinescu 
under Pressure: Either at the CNSAS or with Patriciu-Vantu”), Evenimentul Zilei, January 25, 
2007. 
79. Consiliul National Pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securitatii and Anca Hriban, “CNSAS in 
adormire” (“CNSAS Asleep”), Ziua, January 15, 2007. 
80. Kirsten Sparre, “Romanian President Wants Securitate Files on Athletes Opened,” 
PlayTheGame.org, September 8, 2006. 
81. See the website of Consiliul National Pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securitatii, Op. Cit. 
82. Presedintele Romaniei, April 5, 2006, and Craig S. Smith, “President of Romania Denounces 
Soviet Era,” International Herald Tribune (Europe), December 18, 2006. 
83. Craig S. Smith, Ibid. 
84. Craig S. Smith, Ibid., and Gelu Trandafir, “Romania Officially Indicts Former Communist 
Regime,” Southeast European Times, December 20, 2006. 
85. “Secret Police Row Grips Romania,” BBC News, August 17, 2006.  
